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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Dred Scott v. Sandford1 began as a relatively simple dispute over Scott’s 
status but developed into a complex legal snarl.  Scott brought suit in 
Missouri where he was held as a slave, arguing that he had become free as a 
result of his former residence with his master in Illinois.2  The Supreme 
Court was initially ready to dispose of the case on relatively narrow grounds.  
Until the oral argument in the Supreme Court, no issue had been raised as to 
 
      * Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.  This article is part of 
Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme Mistakes symposium, exploring the most maligned 
decisions in Supreme Court history. 
 1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  The case continues to attract interest today, as seen by recent 
scholarship.  See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49 (2007); Sarah H. Cleveland, Foreign Authority, American Exceptionalism, 
and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393 (2007); Harry V. Jaffa, Dred Scott Revisited, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 197 (2008); Gerald Leonard, Law and Politics Reconsidered: A New 
Constitutional History of Dred Scott, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 747 (2009). 
 2. EARL MALTZ, DRED SCOTT AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 102–03 (2007).  Factual 
background on the case is explored in LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED SCOTT: A LIFE ON 
SLAVERY’S FRONTIER (2009). 
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whether Scott was freed by virtue of living in a territory where Congress 
banned slavery.3  Reversing its course, the majority decided to abandon a 
narrow decision and instead to resolve the slavery issue once and for all.4  
The opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Taney took the occasion to rule 
that free blacks could never become citizens of the United States, that 
Congress lacked the power to limit slavery in the territories, and that federal 
legislation limiting slavery anywhere would violate the Due Process Clause.5 
The late David Currie’s biting legal critique of the opinion probably 
represents the view of most constitutional law scholars today.6  As he says, 
the “variety of feeble, poorly developed, and unnecessary constitutional 
arguments suggests, if nothing else, a determination to reach a 
predetermined conclusion at any price.”7 
The Taney opinion also occupies suspect moral ground.  Unlike some 
other judges of the time, Taney was untroubled by the moral dimensions of 
his judicial support for slavery.  Robert Cover’s book, Justice Accused,8 tells 
the story of Northern judges forced to carry out a deeply immoral law, the 
Fugitive Slave Act, by their fidelity to law.  In contrast, Chief Justice Taney 
went far out of his way to leap to the defense of slavery and racism.  If many 
Northern judges were unwilling bridegrooms of evil, Taney can only be 
considered an ardent suitor.  Consistent with the biblical maxim that he who 
sows the wind shall inherit the whirlwind,9 Taney’s opinion may well have 
been a contributing factor in bringing about the bloodiest of America’s wars 
and the destruction of slavery.10 
Dred Scott has been the subject of scrutiny for over a century and a half, 
including some exceptional works of historical scholarship and a recent 
group of revisionist defenders.  This brief essay will not attempt to 
synthesize, let alone survey, that scholarship, nor will it dwell on the details 
of the decision.  Instead, it will limit itself to a few key points. 
Part II puts the opinion in historical context.  In political terms, the case 
involved the explosive issue of slavery in the territories.  In constitutional 
terms, it raised complex issues about Congress’s regulatory power over the 
territories, the status of free blacks, and whether slavery was a portable 
status or relied for its existence on local law.  Taney’s opinion reflected the 
increasingly strident Southern view of these issues. 
 
 3. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS 288 (1978). 
 4. See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 6. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS, 1789–1888, at 263–72 (1985). 
 7. Id. at 272. 
 8. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). 
 9. Hosea 8:7. 
 10. See infra notes 134–41 and accompanying text. 
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Part III discusses three aspects of the opinion: its effort to ensure that 
blacks could never be citizens, let alone equal ones; its deployment of a 
“limited government” argument for a narrow interpretation of Congress’s 
enumerated power over the territories; and its path-breaking defense of 
property rights against government regulation.  These constitutional tropes 
of racism, narrowing of federal power, and protection of property were to 
remain dominant in constitutional law for another seventy-five years.  The 
Court did not give up its quest to limit congressional power in the interest of 
property rights until the New Deal.11  Indeed, it was not until Brown v. 
Board of Education,12 nearly a century after Dred Scott, that one could truly 
say that the American legal system had repudiated Taney’s legacy of racism. 
At the risk of gilding the lily, Part IV explains why Dred Scott deserves 
a unique place of infamy in American constitutional law.  Dred Scott 
exemplified the collapse of efforts to find common ground between 
contending factions and, in particular, the growing insistence of Southerners 
on the need for absolute assurances about the safe future of slavery.  Apart 
from the failings of the opinion itself, Dred Scott also represents an 
extraordinary case of presidential intrusion into the judicial process and a 
breakdown in fair procedure within the Court itself.  We can never know 
whether a more measured decision would have forestalled the conflict that 
led to the deaths of 800,000 Americans, but it can at least be said that the 
Court did nothing to inject common sense or balance into the national 
debate.  Throwing more fuel on the fire is seldom the best way to avoid an 
explosion. 
Part V closes with some reflections about the implications of Dred Scott 
for judicial methodology.  Taney’s exercise in originalist constitutional 
interpretation highlights some pitfalls that present-day originalists would do 
well to avoid.  Taney’s effort to read all of the Constitution through a states’ 
rights, pro-slavery lens also dramatizes the risks of foundationalism.  
Taney’s opinion lacks any sense of balance—a failing at any time for a 
judge, but particularly dangerous when the nation is poised over a historic 
abyss.  To use a different metaphor, never has a judge gambled so badly for 
such high stakes. 
 
 
 
 11. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942) (finding that the Court could not 
enjoin congressional regulation of local intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce). 
 12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 16 
II.  DRED SCOTT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Like any judicial decision, Dred Scott cannot be fully understood 
outside of its historical context.  Part A briefly reviews some key aspects of 
the disputes over slavery that culminated in Dred Scott and later led to civil 
war.  The uneasy legal and political status of slavery in the early years of the 
Republic had become a much more polarized dispute by the 1850s.  As a 
prelude for the remainder of this essay, Part B provides a sketch of the Dred 
Scott decision itself.  Even a century and a half later, it is startling to see how 
many fundamental constitutional issues Taney reached out to unnecessarily 
decide.  The closing pages of the opinion show that routine application of res 
judicata (holding the state court’s judgment against Scott to be binding) or 
choice-of-law doctrines (applying Missouri law to the dispute) would have 
sufficed to dispose of the case.  Instead, Taney reached out to brand blacks 
as eternally unequal to the legal status of whites and to bar any effort by 
Congress to control the spread of slavery. 
A.  Slavery and Ante Bellum Legal Disputes 
To put Dred Scott in context, some understanding of pre-Civil War legal 
thought is needed.  While it is true that the Constitution provided some 
protections for slavery, early American jurists did not regard the “peculiar 
institution” with any great enthusiasm.  Justice Story condemned slavery as 
immoral and argued that “every doctrine, that may be fairly deduced 
[from] . . . the nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist 
in the law of nations; and unless it be relaxed or waived by the consent of 
nations, . . . it may be enforced by a court of justice.”13  He concluded that a 
slave ship is guilty of piracy under international law, except when the flag 
state permits the slave trade.  Similarly, in In re Antelope,14 Chief Justice 
Marshall began with this premise concerning the slave trade: 
That it is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied.  That 
every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labour, is 
generally admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive 
him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will, seems to 
be the necessary result of this admission.15 
 
 13. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).  For 
background on this case, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 100–16 (1975). 
 14. 23 U.S. 66 (1825). 
 15. Id. at 120. 
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Marshall found, however, that the practice of nations fell lamentably short of 
this standard and hence that the slave trade did not violate international 
law.16 
Story also provided a clear explanation regarding the extraterritorial 
effect of slavery laws: 
Suppose a person to be a slave in his own country, having no 
personal capacity to contract there, is he, upon his removal to a 
foreign country, where slavery is not tolerated, to be still deemed a 
slave?  If so, then a Greek or Asiatic, held in slavery in Turkey, 
would, upon his arrival in England, or in Massachusetts, be deemed 
a slave, and be there subject to be treated as mere property, and be 
under the uncontrollable despotic power of his master.  The same 
rule would exist as to Africans and others, held in slavery in foreign 
countries.17 
Slavery, Justice Story continued, was a personal status and one that required 
affirmative support from local law: 
But we know, that no such general effect has in practice ever been 
attributed to the state of slavery.  There is a uniformity of opinion 
among foreign jurists, and foreign tribunals, in giving no effect to 
the state of slavery of a party, whatever it might have been in the 
country of his birth or of that, in which he had been previously 
domiciled, unless it is also recognized by the laws of the country of 
his actual domicile, and where he is found, and it is sought to be 
enforced.18 
Story also explained that English law adopted the same result: 
This is also the undisputed law of England.  It has been solemnly 
decided, that the law of England abhors, and will not endure, the 
existence of slavery within the nation; and consequently, as soon as 
a slave lands, in England, he becomes ipso facto a freeman; and 
discharged from the state of servitude.  Independent of the 
 
 16. Id. at 120–21. 
 17. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC § 96 
(Edmund Hastings Bennett ed., 5th ed. 1857) (citations omitted) [hereinafter STORY].  For further 
discussion of Justice Story’s perspective, see Christopher L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and 
the Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 273 (1988). 
 18. STORY, supra note 17, § 96. 
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provisions of the Constitution of the United States, for the 
protection of the rights of masters in regard to domestic fugitive 
slaves, there is no doubt, that the same principle pervades the 
common law of the non-slave-holding States in America; that is to 
say, foreign slaves would no longer be deemed such after their 
removal thither.19 
This position ultimately derived from Lord Mansfield’s famous statement 
that: “The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons . . . but only [by] positive law . . . : it’s so odious, 
that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law.”20 
A wealth of American cases supported the view that slavery could exist 
only when supported by local, positive law (that is, legislation).  Until just 
before the Civil War, this position was taken even by Southern courts.  In 
cases where slaves had been brought to free states for more than a brief 
sojourn, Southern courts generally ruled that they remained free even on 
their return to slave states.  Under that rule, Dred Scott would have been 
entitled to freedom.  Only in the final years before the war did this position 
change.  Indeed, in the state court litigation involving Dred Scott, the 
Missouri Supreme Court engaged in just such an about-face, announcing that 
it would no longer follow earlier decisions that gave comity to Northern 
laws banning slavery for long-term residents.21 
Perhaps it was fitting that Missouri would later be the scene of the Dred 
Scott litigation, because decades earlier it had already become pivotal in 
slavery disputes.  By 1820, Missouri’s effort to join the Union had led to a 
crisis, ending with the compromise solution of limiting future expansion of 
slavery north of a line drawn at 36º 30’ 00” N.  The battle over the extension 
of slavery to new territories was reignited by the war with Mexico.  Some 
Northerners argued that Congress had the power to forbid slavery in the 
territories, as had been done in the old Northwest Ordinance before the 
Constitution was even adopted.  Led by John C. Calhoun, some Southerners 
responded that the territories were held in trust by the federal government on 
behalf of all the states, and that discriminating against the institutions of the 
slave states would be unconstitutional.  Calhoun’s theory was later embraced 
by Taney’s opinion.  By 1849, some Southern states were threatening 
secession if the Wilmot Proviso banning slavery in the newly acquired 
territories was adopted.  But the crisis was defused by the Compromise of 
1850, designed by Henry Clay but actually pushed through Congress by 
Stephen A. Douglas.  By assembling separate coalitions on different parts of 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) 510.  Today Lord Mansfield is 
considered one of the great creators of modern commercial law. 
 21. See Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852). 
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the compromise, Douglas obtained passage of a package that included 
something for each side.  For the North, the Compromise admitted 
California as a free state and abolished the slave trade in the District of 
Columbia.  For the South, it strengthened the Fugitive Slave Act and created 
the New Mexico and Utah territories without the Wilmot Proviso.22 
The story of the 1850s is in large part the saga of how this apparent 
settlement of the slavery issue came unglued.  In the process, the conflict 
destroyed the Democratic Party as a national institution, taking Stephen 
Douglas along with it.  It also created the Republicans as a sectional party, 
ultimately leading to Lincoln’s election.  The combined effect was to 
produce Lincoln’s election and the secession crisis.  The process was 
incredibly complicated, but we can focus on three major contributing 
factors.23 
First, enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act horrified many Northerners.  
The spectacle of escaped slaves being dragged away in manacles roused 
public opinion against slavery.  The number of slaves who escaped to the 
North was quite small, and even fewer were ever returned under the Act.  
For a statute whose value to slave owners was largely symbolic, the South 
paid a heavy price in Northern anger and resentment.24 
Second, Douglas unwittingly reignited the issue of slavery in the 
territories with his Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Douglas was eager to organize 
these territories in order to pave the way for settlement and a 
transcontinental railroad.  By adopting “popular sovereignty,” which left 
control of the slavery decision to the territorial legislature, Douglas hoped to 
finesse the slavery issue and keep it off the national agenda.  His tactic 
backfired.  Northerners were appalled by the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise.  Implementation of the statute was also a disaster.  Kansas 
became the scene of bloodshed as rival groups of Northerners and 
Southerners vied for control.  Worse, the Buchanan Administration broke its 
pledges and endorsed the fraudulent, pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution 
for Kansas.  This was intolerable to Douglas, who broke with the 
Administration.  When Buchanan threatened to destroy him politically, 
 
 22. See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848–1861, at 18–23, 53–62, 88–89, 108, 
113–16 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976). 
 23. For a comprehensive historical review of the issue of slavery in the territories, see MICHAEL 
A. MORRISON, SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN WEST: THE ECLIPSE OF MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE 
COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1997). 
 24. See POTTER, supra note 22, at 132–37; see also 1 ALLAN NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF 
LINCOLN: DOUGLAS, BUCHANAN, AND PARTY CHAOS, 1859–1861, at 229–304 (1950) [hereinafter 1 
NEVINS]; 2 ALLAN NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF LINCOLN: PROLOGUE TO CIVIL WAR, 1859–1861, 
at 30–31, 115, 488–89 (1950) [hereinafter 2 NEVINS]; KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE IMPERILED 
UNION: ESSAYS ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL WAR 237 (1980). 
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reminding him that Jackson had destroyed his own opponents within the 
Democratic Party, Douglas was not impressed.  “Mr. President,” he replied, 
“I wish you to remember that General Jackson is dead.”25  But despite this 
bravado, Douglas had to fight for his political life against Buchanan.  The 
schism between the two men badly damaged the Democratic Party in the 
North, thereby strengthening the emerging Republican Party.26  In Dred 
Scott, by holding that the people of a territory had no power to restrict 
slavery, Chief Justice Taney intervened on the side of Buchanan.  This was 
perhaps intentional, for as we will see later, Buchanan actively involved 
himself in the Court’s deliberations. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Intervention in Dred Scott 
Dred Scott’s claim to freedom was based on his sojourn in Illinois and 
in the Minnesota Territory, where slavery was banned.  Chief Justice 
Taney’s opinion for the Court had two major holdings.  First, even if Scott 
was free, blacks could never become citizens of the United States (nor, for 
federal constitutional purposes, of the states where they lived).  Second, 
Congress lacked the power to ban slavery in the territories, making the 
Missouri Compromise unconstitutional along with the basic platform of the 
Republican Party.  Because several concurring opinions were filed, 
historians still dispute just what parts of Taney’s opinion had the support of 
a majority of the Justices.  As discussed later, Buchanan had not only been 
informed about the opinion prior to its release but played an active role in 
bringing one key Justice into the majority.  Despite the Court’s hopes of 
finally putting the vexing issue of slavery to rest, its opinion had the 
opposite effect.27 
There was no need for the Court to have even considered these broad 
arguments.  As Justice Nelson’s concurring opinion pointed out, Taney 
could have applied earlier precedent and held that Missouri law controlled 
Dred Scott’s legal status on his return to that state.28  Indeed, Nelson was 
 
 25. 1 NEVINS, supra note 24, at 253. 
 26. See POTTER, supra note 22, at 158–59, 199–224, 297–325; see also 2 ALLAN NEVINS, 
ORDEAL OF THE UNION: A HOUSE DIVIDING, 1852–1857, at 78–159, 301–46 (1947); KENNETH M. 
STAMPP, AMERICA IN 1857: A NATION ON THE BRINK 144–81, 257–331 (1990). 
 27. Don E. Fehrenbacher’s The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics 
is a classic treatment of the historical context, legal complexities, decisional process, and impact of 
the case.  FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3.  It is more readily available in an abridged paperback, DON 
E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1981).  Another useful treatment is PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A 
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (1997), which also contains excerpts from the long, meandering 
opinions and reprints the responses of Northern and Southern papers to the decision.  For a brief 
introduction to the case and its effects, see RICHARD H. SEWELL, A HOUSE DIVIDED: SECTIONALISM 
AND CIVIL WAR, 1848–1865, at 57–61 (1988). 
 28. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 457–63, 465 (1857) (Nelson, J., concurring). 
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originally assigned to write an opinion for the Court on this very ground.29  
But deciding the case on that basis would have deprived Taney of the 
opportunity to carve white supremacy into constitutional stone and to strike 
a blow for the slave states against the North. 
In the last two pages of the opinion, Taney added yet another ground for 
reversal—one which would seemingly obviate the rest of the opinion: Dred 
Scott had already lost in the state courts, and the judgment there disposed of 
the controversy and was binding in federal court.30  That would have seemed 
to require a straightforward application of res judicata, an argument that any 
first year law student would be expected to apply on a civil procedure exam.  
Thus, finally—after sixty pages of rambling exegesis on constitutional 
issues—Taney got around to an argument that makes clear legal sense.  Of 
course, if he had started and ended with that point, there would have been no 
need for the rest of the opinion, and the case would be unknown today 
except perhaps to a few civil procedure specialists. 
III.  DRED SCOTT AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 
Chief Justice Taney’s legal analysis deserves attention given the historic 
importance of the case.  It also deserves attention because of its 
foreshadowing of Lochner-era constitutional jurisprudence.  It was the first 
Supreme Court decision to endorse white supremacy as a constitutional 
norm, the first to strike down a law of Congress on federalism grounds, and 
the first to use the Due Process Clause to entrench the economic status quo.  
Thus, it was an initial foray into legal ground later to be occupied by 
opinions such as Plessy v. Ferguson31 (upholding racial segregation), 
Champion v. Ames32 (holding on federalism grounds that Congress could not 
ban child labor), and Lochner v. New York33 (striking down labor laws that 
protected employees). 
The point is not that these later judges consciously or unconsciously 
adopted Dred Scott’s reasoning.  No doubt many of them would have been 
horrified by the suggestion.  Rather, they may well have rediscovered 
independently how conveniently such arguments could be used to defeat 
efforts to regulate economic relations, whether between masters and slaves 
or employers and employees.  Taney deserves credit, if that is the right term, 
 
 29. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 306–07. 
 30. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 454. 
 31. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
 32. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
 33. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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for his prescience in mapping out a course for conservative jurisprudence 
over the next seventy-five years. 
Part A will consider what is, to modern readers, the most offensive 
portion of the opinion: the racism that Taney claims belonged to the earlier 
era of the Framers but obviously reflects his own deep-seated prejudices.  
Part B turns to the tortured interpretation of Congress’s enumerated power 
over the territories, while Part C examines Taney’s use of the Due Process 
Clause. 
A.  Citizenship, Race and the Constitution 
A key issue in Dred Scott—or at least an issue that Taney chose to 
confront—is the relationship between state and federal citizenship.  It is 
important to begin by understanding the general confusion that existed on 
this score up to the Civil War.  The question of “whether the Revolution had 
created one community of allegiance or many” remained unresolved.34  Just 
three weeks after the Declaration of Independence, the Continental Congress 
passed a resolution providing that “all persons residing within any of the 
United Colonies, and deriving protection from the laws of the same, owe 
allegiance to the said laws, and are members of such colony.”35 
The states quickly adopted their own naturalization laws,36 but their 
power over citizenship was a source of confusion because each state’s 
citizens became entitled to equal treatment in all other states under the 
Articles of Confederation’s precursor to what is now the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.37  According to Kettner, who remains the 
leading authority on the history of citizenship before the Civil War, 
“Although the primary locus of allegiance throughout the Confederation 
period was still in the individual sovereign state, the idea that citizens 
belonged to a larger national community surfaced frequently, never fully 
articulated or theoretically explored, but persuasive—almost instinctive—in 
certain contexts.”38  For instance, it was unclear whether a person who had 
been naturalized by a state under the Articles was thereby a citizen of the 
United States for purposes of qualifying to sit in the United States Senate.39  
Notably, naturalization could proceed through treaties with Indians or as part 
 
 34. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at 209 
(1978). 
 35. Id. at 179. 
 36. Id. at 214–19. 
 37. Id. at 220. 
 38. Id. at 224. 
 39. Id. at 234–35.  For an overview of immigration policy prior to the Constitution, see James E. 
Pfander, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, 
and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 371–85 (2010). 
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of the admission of a new state (as in the case of Texas and Louisiana).40  It 
was clear from a variety of treaties and statutes that Indians as well as whites 
could become citizens—thus, it is an oversimplification to identify 
citizenship with whiteness.41 
The connections between citizenship, allegiance, and government 
protection went back in English law at least to the time of Lord Coke, during 
the reign of James I.  Coke was faced with such issues in the context of 
determining the rights of citizens of Scotland under English law.42  James 
was king of both England and Scotland, but they had separate parliaments so 
it was not clear how their citizenships related.  Fundamental to Coke’s 
analysis was the proposition that the “bond between the subject and the 
sovereign . . . involved reciprocal obligations” of allegiance and protection 
that attached at birth.43 
The predominant Southern theory—although not the theory that 
Southerners found convenient in the context of Dred Scott—was that 
citizenship stemmed from the states.  Based on the theory that individual 
allegiance flowed fundamentally to the states, the Confederacy maintained 
that no change in allegiance took place at secession.  Thus, unlike the 
American Revolution, where individuals were considered to have a period in 
which to choose allegiance, the allegiance of Southerners automatically 
remained with the existing states when those state governments chose to 
sever their own relationship with the federal government.44  A similar 
situation would arise today if the United States decided to leave the United 
Nations or NATO; such a decision would clearly have no effect on the status 
of U.S. citizens.  Thus, Southerners who, following secession, decided to 
side with the North were guilty of treason, while colonists who sided with 
the British were not guilty of treason provided they made their decision 
promptly and openly.45 
During the nullification crisis, South Carolina insisted that “[t]he 
allegiance of the citizens . . . is due to the . . . State, and . . . obedience only, 
and not allegiance, is due . . . to any other power or authority, to whom a 
controul over them has been or may be delegated by the state.”46  The state 
legislature then passed a law requiring all militia officers to swear that they 
 
 40. KETTNER, supra note 34, at 251–53. 
 41. Id. at 292. 
 42. Id. at 16–17. 
 43. Id. at 18. 
 44. Id. at 335. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 265. 
 24 
had “faithful and true allegiance” to the state.47  The law was held 
unconstitutional by the state appellate court, with a dissenting nullifier 
arguing that only the state government could command a citizen’s ultimate 
allegiance.48  Southerners also argued that a national statute governing 
expatriation (abandonment of citizenship) would be unconstitutional because 
it was not within any express Congressional power, leaving the matter to the 
states.49  As a U.S. Representative from Virginia put it, “The relation to the 
State government was the basis of the relation to the General Government, 
and therefore, as long as a man continues a citizen of a State, he must be 
considered a citizen of the United States.”50 
Thus, the relative priorities of federal and state citizenship were matters 
in some dispute.  The dominant Southern theory was that state citizenship 
was paramount, but in the context of Dred Scott this would have led to the 
unpalatable conclusion that the status of blacks as citizens in Northern states 
would have been entitled to recognition in Southern states. 
Taney’s opinion contended that the Framers considered blacks “as a 
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to 
their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the 
power and the Government might choose to grant them.”51  Justice Daniels 
managed to exceed even Taney’s level of offensiveness with his dictum: 
“That in the establishment of the several communities now the States of this 
Union, and in the formation of the Federal Government, the African was not 
deemed politically a person.”52  Note, however, that the Constitution refers 
to slaves as “person[s] held to service,” as Justice McLean pointed out.53  It 
is also significant that Indians had long been held eligible for citizenship and 
that some Southern courts had held that free blacks automatically became 
state citizens.54  Moreover, an 1803 federal statute banned ships from 
bringing any black into the country who was not “a native, a citizen, or 
registered seaman of the United States.”55 
In addition to this federalism question regarding citizenship, Dred Scott 
held that there was a racial exception to the normal rule of birthright U.S. 
citizenship.  There is no doubt that in the Civil War era racism was 
widespread, even in the North.  For many, the issue was not so much an 
objection to slavery as a desire to keep all blacks out of the territories.  
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 267. 
 49. Id. at 282–83. 
 50. Id. at 283. 
 51. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1857). 
 52. Id. at 481 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. at 537 (McLean, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 54. KETTNER, supra note 34, at 316–19. 
 55. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 587 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, many Republicans repeatedly found it necessary to reaffirm 
publicly their disinclination toward miscegenation and their belief in white 
supremacy.  Savvy politicians like Lincoln were careful not to offend racist 
audiences.  This was a constant theme in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, most 
notably in the Charleston, Illinois debate where Lincoln denied being “in 
favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the 
white and black races.”56  So Taney was certainly appealing to widespread 
racism with his racial characterization of citizenship. 
McLean also pointed out that Taney’s historical exegesis was 
remarkably one-sided: “[W]hile I admit the government was not made 
especially for the colored race, . . . many of them were citizens of the New 
England States, and exercised the rights of suffrage when the Constitution 
was adopted . . . .”57  This may not prove that they were regarded as U.S. 
citizens, but it does rebut Taney’s assertion that blacks were incapable of 
being members of the political community or of having legal rights that 
others were required to accept. 
One reason for the relative paucity of evidence of the Framers’ 
definition of citizenship is that they were rarely required to consider it.  
Citizenship is an important legal concept, but not necessarily decisive in a 
broad range of contexts.  In many respects, personhood is the more 
important concept under the U.S. Constitution.  In the Constitution itself, 
citizenship’s main significance is as a job qualification for elected federal 
office.  But there is no requirement of citizenship for appointed office as a 
member of the judiciary or the Cabinet, nor any limitation of the franchise to 
citizens.  Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 provides that voters for House 
members “have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most 
numerous Branch of the State Legislature,” so blacks could vote in federal 
elections if they could vote in state ones.58  Under Article I, Section 3, 
Clause 1, members of the Senate are chosen by state legislatures, with no 
stated restriction on who could serve in such a legislature.59  Otherwise, the 
term “citizen” shows up only in Article III’s definition of diversity 
jurisdiction,60 and in Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.61  Only 
in these two clauses is state citizenship rather than federal citizenship 
invoked.  And despite Taney’s restriction of Article III diversity jurisdiction 
 
 56. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, LINCOLN IN TEXT AND CONTEXT: COLLECTED ESSAYS 101 
(1987) (discussing Lincoln’s views on race). 
 57. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 537 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
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to whites, there was no apparent constitutional barrier to blacks bringing suit 
under admiralty or federal question jurisdiction. 
Other portions of the Constitution involve personhood rather than 
citizenship.  Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 provides a right to a jury in the 
“Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,” without reference to 
citizenship.62  Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 prohibits bills of attainder and ex 
post facto laws without any reference to the citizenship of the defendant.63  
Some provisions of the Bill of Rights refer to “the people,” which by 
Taney’s reasoning might not have included blacks.  But the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, governing due process and criminal procedure, are not so 
limited, nor is the right to jury trial in civil cases of the Seventh Amendment.  
Because Taney viewed the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as 
protecting substantive rights of liberty and property, free blacks were clearly 
entitled to this basic constitutional protection, at least if constitutional text 
means anything at all. 
Taney’s argument about citizenship seems ungrounded in 
constitutional text, judicial precedent, or standard constitutional 
historical sources such as Madison’s convention notes or the Federalist 
Papers.  It is based on speculation about what the Framers might have 
intended.  Don Fehrenbacher remarked that Taney’s “language often 
tended to become most dogmatic when his argument became most 
dubious,” and that “[h]e sometimes used a phrase such as ‘too plain for 
argument’ to introduce an assertion flagrantly contrary to fact.”64  This 
was surely true in Dred Scott. 
Much of Taney’s opinion consists of speculation about what the 
Framers must have thought despite the lack of any specific evidence to that 
effect.  For instance, he argued that Southerners could not have meant to 
allow Northern blacks any rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
and therefore must not have intended that they qualify as citizens of the 
Northern states.  Taney offers no direct evidence of pre-ratification 
discussion of the clause to support this contention.  A more relevant 
indication of intent, as Justice Curtis observed in dissent, is the rejection of a 
proposal by South Carolina to limit the Privilege and Immunities Clause’s 
predecessor in the Articles of Confederation to whites.65 
Historians, by and large, have not found Taney’s speculation persuasive: 
“Obviously, Taney was reading southern apprehensions of the 1850s back 
into the minds of southerners in 1787, forgetting his earlier assertion that 
free Negroes were then so few in number that they ‘were not even in the 
 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 64. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 268–69. 
 65. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 575–76 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
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minds of the framers of the Constitution.’”66  In any event, Taney offers 
nothing that speaks to what the Framers might have thought about diversity 
jurisdiction, and the purposes of diversity jurisdiction clearly support 
allowing disputes between free blacks inhabiting one state and citizens of 
some other state the benefit of a forum unbiased by local loyalties. 
The definition of citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction was 
clearly understood to be a distinctive question in Taney’s time: 
corporations chartered in a state qualified as state citizens for diversity 
purposes,67 but obviously no one thought this made them citizens of the 
United States for purposes of holding federal office.  Taney’s argument 
reflects what he viewed as the unacceptability to the Framers of treating 
slaves as citizens for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but 
had little or no relevance to defining citizenship for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction.  For instance, he argued that if free blacks were treated as 
citizens and entered a Southern state, the results would have been 
horrendous and unacceptable: 
It would give to persons of the negro race . . . the right to enter 
every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, 
without pass or passport . . . to go where they pleased at every hour 
of the day or night without molestation, . . . and it would give them 
the full liberty of speech . . . and to keep and carry arms wherever 
they went.  And all of this would be done in the face of the subject 
race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably 
producing discontent and insubordination among them, and 
endangering the peace and safety of the State. 
 It is impossible, it would seem, to believe that the great men of 
the slaveholding States, who took so large a share in framing the 
Constitution of the United States, and exercised so much influence 
in procuring its adoption, could have been so forgetful or regardless 
of their own safety and the safety of those who trusted and confided 
in them.68 
 
 66. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 355–56 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 411–12). 
 67. Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844).  
Given this decision, despite Dred Scott, a black could have gotten into federal court by conducting 
business affairs through a wholly owned corporation.  Indeed, blacks theoretically could have 
litigated their status by getting a wholly owned corporation chartered, contracting with the 
corporation for their services, and then having the corporation sue the putative owner for interfering 
with the execution of the labor contract. 
 68. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 417. 
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The logic of this passage deserves unpacking: 
1. If the status of free blacks as citizens was determined by the laws of 
the state where they resided, then this must apply not only to the Diversity 
Clause but to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
2. When free blacks visited a Southern state, perhaps because there was 
no correlative class of free black citizens in that state, they would necessarily 
have the same rights as all other (white) citizens, including the right to bear 
arms, etc. 
3. This would pose a grave threat of sparking a slave insurrection. 
4. The Southern participants in the adoption of the Constitution must 
have known this, so they could not have possibly consented to such an 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
5. Hence, the Diversity Clause cannot be construed to allow citizenship 
to be determined by state law. 
Every step of this reasoning is contestable, but as is often the case, the 
whole argument is driven by the unstated assumption at the beginning.  The 
key move is equating “diversity” citizenship with “privileges and 
immunities” citizenship. 
Shifting the focus from privileges and immunities to diversity 
jurisdiction not only eliminates the basis for Taney’s argument but suggests 
some strong arguments against excluding blacks from citizenship.  Indeed, 
the same kind of logic used by Taney could be used to derive a contrary 
conclusion about diversity citizenship.  Based on reasoning similar to 
Taney’s, we could argue that Southern whites would surely have rejected 
Taney’s reading of the Diversity Clause to exclude free blacks at the time of 
the Framing.  The reason is that, although Taney’s reading of the Diversity 
Clause worked to Dred Scott’s disadvantage in this particular case, it also 
resulted in giving free blacks a special exemption from being subjected to 
federal diversity jurisdiction.  If a Southerner wished to sue a Northern 
white, the Southerner could bring suit in a Northern federal court rather than 
being relegated to the potentially biased state court.  But if he wished to sue 
a Northern black, he would have to give the black the home court advantage 
of a state forum.  Similarly, if a Southerner owned property in the North and 
was subjected to a quasi in rem suit by a Northern white, the Southerner 
could remove to federal court, but he would lack the ability to do so if sued 
by a Northern black.  Surely the Framers of the Constitution did not expect 
blacks to enjoy this special privilege! 
Whatever the Framers expected to be the status of free blacks under 
state law or federal legislation, there is no direct evidence that they viewed 
the Constitution as precluding them from becoming citizens, particularly 
given the fact that in five states blacks were entitled to vote for the members 
of the convention ratifying the Constitution.69  There is also little evidence 
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that the legal system recognized any other category besides citizens and 
those holding allegiance to other sovereigns (whether foreign or an Indian 
tribe).  For instance, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state 
by “Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State,”70 without any third category of “non-citizen subjects of the other 
state.”  Given the absence of any other legal category and the obvious fact 
that blacks were not subjects of any foreign power, it is hard to see how the 
Framers’ conceptual framework allowed free blacks to be anything other 
than citizens.71 
Revisionists argue that “the persistent strand of white nationalism in 
American politics provides strong support for Taney’s claim that most 
persons responsible for the Constitution thought that Dred Scott was not and 
could not become a citizen of the United States.”72  Even if the Framers 
assumed that blacks would not be United States citizens, relying on such 
expectations as a basis for constitutional interpretation can be a slippery 
process.  Undoubtedly, the Framers would also have expected that no black 
could be a federal judge, member of Congress, or Cabinet member.  It is 
more certain that they did not expect women to hold national office, but that 
assumption does not make male sex a prerequisite for the Presidency, the 
Senate, or the Supreme Court.  They probably also assumed that interstate 
commerce would involve land or sea rather than air transportation.  To 
translate the Framers’ alleged expectations about black exclusion from 
citizenship into a constitutional rule, Taney needed an argument linking the 
two that is simply absent from the opinion. 
But all of this is much too legalistic.  Taney was not really making a 
legal argument about the original understanding of the term “citizenship.”  
Most of his evidence was at most tangentially relevant to that issue of legal 
terminology.  His argument was that blacks were outside the social compact 
entirely at the time of the Framing.  For instance, Taney was at pains to 
establish that blacks were not covered by the Declaration of Independence’s 
proclamation that “all men are created equal,” and “endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights.”73  This had no real relevance to the 
constitutional argument, but supported Taney’s real point, which is that 
blacks are outside of the social compact and for that reason barely qualify as 
persons, let alone citizens. 
 
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 71. Cf. State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 144 (1838) (“According to the laws of this 
State, all human beings within it, fall within one of two classes, to wit, aliens and citizens.”). 
 72. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 57 (2006). 
 73. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407, 410 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 2 (U.S. 1776)). 
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In Taney’s view, a “free” black was just a slave who happened to 
temporarily lack an individual master and therefore was owned by the white 
community as a whole.  Or, to be fair, this was Taney’s view of the Framers’ 
prejudices that was implicitly enshrined in the Constitution.  In Taney’s 
words: 
[A] perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected 
between the white race and the one which they had reduced to 
slavery, and governed as subject with absolute and despotic power, 
and which they then looked upon as so far below them in the scale 
of created beings, that intermarriages between white persons and 
negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral . . . . 
And no distinction in this respect was made between the free negro 
or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma, of the deepest degradation, 
was fixed upon the whole race.74 
Furthermore, Taney said that at the time of the Founding, blacks were 
separated from whites “by indelible marks, and laws long before established, 
and were never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the 
claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need 
protection.”75  In short, in the single most remembered phrase from Taney’s 
opinion, blacks were regarded as “so far inferior, that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect.”76 
This vision of free blacks as having little more status than slaves was 
approximately correct in slave states in Taney’s own time.  As Fehrenbacher 
says: 
 Black “freedom” in a slaveholding state, however, was in many 
respects little more than a special category of slavery.  The southern 
free Negro lived in a precarious world cramped between two fairly 
distinct boundaries—the legal line separating him from the great 
mass of blacks and the color line separating him from the great 
mass of free men.  More often than not, it was the color line that 
determined his status and treatment in any specific circumstance.77 
Fehrenbacher observes that, in Taney’s time, “[i]ncreasingly, free Negroes 
were equated with slaves in southern law”78 and were subject to the risk of 
involuntary servitude.79  Thus Taney’s view of non-slave blacks as enjoying 
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only a simulacrum of freedom was consistent with antebellum Southern 
views. 
But, whatever may have been true in Taney’s time, there really was no 
evidence that the Framers collectively viewed free blacks as being outside 
the social compact.  Memorably, Jefferson’s draft of the Declaration of 
Independence accused the King of waging “cruel war against human nature 
itself, violating it’s [sic] most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons 
of a distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them 
into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their 
transportation thither.”80  Indeed, the evidence cited by the dissenters 
showed that blacks were treated to a considerable extent as members of the 
legal and political community in many places, even if generally not as fully 
equal members.  For instance, according to the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, at the time of the Framing: 
Slaves manumitted here became freeman—and therefore if born 
within North Carolina are citizens of North Carolina—and all free 
persons within the State are born citizens of the state. . . .  [I]t is a 
matter of universal notoriety that . . . free persons, without regard to 
colour, claimed and exercised the franchise until [the state 
constitution was amended].81 
Unfortunately, Taney’s willingness to read his own racism into the 
Constitution did not die with him or even with the formal grant of 
citizenship to blacks under the Fourteenth Amendment.82  After the Civil 
War, it did not take long for the Court to embrace racist assumptions again 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, where the Court upheld the power of states to treat 
blacks as untouchables.83  It was not until Brown v. Board of Education, a 
century after Dred Scott, that the Court finally embraced racial equality.84 
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B.  Narrow Reading of the Enumerated Powers 
Taney also held that Congress had no power to regulate slavery in the 
territories.  His route to this conclusion was peculiar.  The Property Clause 
unmistakably gives Congress regulatory power over U.S. territories.  It 
provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States.”85  Chief Justice Marshall had emphasized the sweep of 
federal powers over the territories: 
The power of governing and of legislating for a territory is the 
inevitable consequence of the right to acquire and to hold territory.  
Could this position be contested, the constitution of the United 
States declares that “congress shall have power to dispose of and 
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or 
other property belonging to the United States.”  Accordingly, we 
find congress possessing and exercising the absolute and undisputed 
power of governing and legislating for the territory of Orleans.86 
The Property Clause seems to easily encompass the power to regulate 
slavery in the territories, but that interpretation would have been 
inconvenient for Taney for two reasons.  First, it would have made the 
congressional reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance, with its ban on 
slavery, a clear precedent for the Missouri Compromise.  Taney needed a 
theory that distinguished Congress’s power over territories held when the 
Constitution went into effect from territories acquired later.  Second, the 
Property Clause contains no special requirement of equal treatment between 
the interests of various states, but Southerners insisted that the territories 
needed to be governed in a way that respected their interests. 
Thus, it was important for Taney to find some way of taking the 
Property Clause off the table.  In an amazing leap, Taney concluded that the 
clause only applied to territories that were held by the United States when 
the Constitution went into effect.87  Instead, in another leap of creativity, he 
said that the federal government derived its power over territories by 
implication from the congressional power to admit new states into the union, 
which carried an implicit requirement that all of the existing states were to 
be equally respected in adding new territory.88 
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Taney tied these conclusions to a vision of limited government.  
Because the federal government possesses only “certain enumerated and 
restricted powers,” it can only acquire new territory “for the benefit of the 
people of the several States who created it,” acting as “their trustee.”89  For 
Taney said: 
The principle upon which our Governments rest, and upon which 
alone they continue to exist, is the union of States, sovereign and 
independent within their own limits in their internal and domestic 
concerns, and bound together as one people by a General 
Government, possessing certain enumerated and restricted powers, 
delegated to it by the People of the several States . . . .90 
Thus, the federal government’s powers over territories are intrinsically 
limited: 
Whatever [the federal government] acquires, it acquires for the 
benefit of the people of the several States who created it.  It is their 
trustee acting for them, and charged with the duty of promoting the 
interests of the whole people of the Union in the exercise of the 
powers specifically granted.91 
Taney speculated that the Property Clause was only meant to apply to 
the property and territory that various states owned or ceded to the 
Continental Congress at the time the Constitution went into effect.  These 
were tenuous arguments in the absence of any specific evidence.  It is 
striking that these pages of the opinion are almost bereft of citations to 
judicial authority or historical sources.  Taney seemed to feel free to 
speculate without evidence about what the Framers had in mind in order to 
import a temporal limitation on a provision that on its face is permanent. 
Anyone can play that game.  If the Property Clause can be read to apply 
only to property owned at the time the Constitution went into effect, why not 
other parts of the Constitution—say, the Fugitive Slave Clause?  On this 
interpretation, just as Taney thought the Property Clause meant “the 
Territory or other Property [now] belonging to the United States,”92 the 
Fugitive Slave Clause would have applied to any “Person [now] held to 
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Service or Labour in one State.”93  This may seem an audacious reading of 
the Fugitive Slave Clause, but the arguments for that interpretation are only 
a little weaker than Taney’s interpretation of the Property Clause. 
Just as Taney did with the Property Clause, one could point to special 
historical circumstances at the time of the Framing that might have been the 
unspoken subject of the Fugitive Slave Clause.  The American Revolution 
separated slaves from their masters or allowed them to escape in the 
confusion of the war, and even worse, from the Southern perspective, the 
British promised freedom to blacks who joined their side.  It would have 
made sense to provide a special, temporary remedy for the affected slave 
owners as part of the general effort to settle land, debt, and property disputes 
arising from the war. 
As with Taney’s interpretation of the term “citizenship,” one might also 
support this interpretation of the Fugitive Slave Clause with speculation 
about the views of the Framers.  Surely, one might argue, Northern whites 
would not have been willing to accept as a permanent matter the degrading 
duty—indeed, one might say, servile duty—of fetching slaves at the 
command of masters who had been too careless to control their own 
property.  And surely Southern slave owners would not have thought that the 
number of slaves who could escape and travel all the way north during 
normal peacetime conditions would be large enough to warrant a special 
constitutional provision. 
Indeed, in support of the idea that the clause meant to deal only with a 
limited, temporary problem, one might point out that it did not encompass 
slaves who escaped from the territories or the District of Columbia (because 
in those places they were not “held to service” under any state law), nor did 
it include Southern slaves who escaped to a federal territory or the District of 
Columbia.  So it obviously was not intended to provide any comprehensive 
remedy to the owners of escaped slaves.  How much more reasonable to 
interpret it as a part of the post-Revolutionary War settlement of claims and 
debts by the federal government. 
Admittedly, these are not convincing constitutional interpretations, but 
the reasoning follows the same lines as Taney’s and is only slightly less 
plausible than his view that “the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States” meant only that property owned in 1789.94  Fehrenbacher 
accurately says that it is difficult to take Taney’s argument seriously.95  
Rather than legal analysis, however, Taney’s opinion seems primarily to 
reflect his desire to strike a decisive blow for the South.  Before Buchanan’s 
election, he had already worried that the South was “doomed to sink to a 
state of inferiority, and the power of the North will be exercised to gratify 
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their cupidity and their evil passions, without the slightest regard to the 
principles of the Constitution.”96 
The absurdity of Taney’s reasoning is revealed by two key facts.  First, 
at the same time that the Constitution was being drafted, Congress passed 
the Northwest Ordinance, which prohibited slavery in what is now the 
American Midwest.  Second, after the Constitution went into effect, “the 
Northwest Ordinance was re-enacted by a Congress that included many of 
the framers, and there was no resistance on constitutional grounds.”97  
Indeed, the present-day revisionists, who are seeking to rehabilitate the 
decision, seem to have made no effort to defend his tortured approach to the 
Property Clause.98 
Nothing of Taney’s interpretation remains in current law.  In Kleppe v. 
New Mexico,99 the Supreme Court made clear the breadth of the Property 
Clause and its applicability to all federal property and territories: 
It is the Property Clause, for instance, that provides the basis for 
governing the Territories of the United States.  And even over 
public land within the States, “[t]he general government doubtless 
has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of 
the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise 
of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular 
case.” . . . In short, Congress exercises the powers both of a 
proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain.  Although the 
Property Clause does not authorize “an exercise of a general control 
over public policy in a State,” it does permit “an exercise of the 
complete power which Congress has over particular public property 
entrusted to it.”100 
Although Taney’s interpretation of the Property Clause was quickly 
forgotten, his strategy of reading Congress’s enumerated powers narrowly 
was prophetic.  In a series of cases in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, the Court held that Congress lacked the power to regulate 
the economy.  Like Taney, these later Justices were eager to limit federal 
 
 96. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836–64, at 609 (1974). 
 97. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 370. 
 98. See Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott Correctly Decided?  An “Expert Report” for the 
Defendant, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219, 1237 (2008). 
 99. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 100. Id. at 539–40 (citations omitted). 
 36 
power in order to protect their favored economic arrangements from 
potential interference by national majorities. 
C.  Constitutional Protection for Property Rights 
Taney was at pains to show that Congress had no power to interfere with 
the rights of private property.  After reciting the protection of free speech 
and other individual rights, he added that “the rights of private property have 
been guarded with equal care.”101  He continued: “Thus the rights of 
property are united with the rights of person, and placed on the same ground 
by the [F]ifth [A]mendment to the Constitution, which provides that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of 
law.”102  Hence, he concluded: 
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States 
of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or 
brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, 
and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly 
be dignified with the name of due process of law.103 
Taney was determined to sweep beyond any issue actually presented in 
the case in asserting the constitutional right to hold slaves.  He hinted that 
slave owners were entitled to the enactment of federal slave codes, saying 
that it was a congressional “duty to establish” legal rules “that would be best 
suited for the protection and security of the citizens of the United 
States”104—presumably including protection and security for their property.  
He also made it clear that territorial legislatures had no greater powers than 
Congress to regulate slavery: 
And if Congress itself cannot do this—if it is beyond the powers 
conferred on the Federal Government—it will be admitted, we 
presume, that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to 
exercise them.  It could confer no power on any local Government, 
established by its authority, to violate the provisions of the 
Constitution.105 
Of course, this issue was not remotely before the Court, but Taney took 
advantage of the occasion to take a swipe at the Douglas “popular 
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sovereignty” wing of the Democratic Party in order to strengthen the 
position of the more extremist wing. 
Whether the Due Process Clause provides protection against the 
substance of legislation, as opposed to the right to a hearing, remains hotly 
disputed today.  Still, the modern Supreme Court has continued to view the 
clause as providing substantive protection to property and liberty.  Even so, 
it is a bit of a stretch to say that due process protects the right to possess 
property in a territory if it is legal to possess it anywhere in the Union.  On 
this theory, the government would have no constitutional power to ban 
marijuana in Guam since its possession for medicinal purposes is legal in 
California.  Even more sweepingly, one could make the same “least common 
denominator” argument regarding liberty, so that Congress could regulate 
conduct in the territories or in the District of Columbia only if that conduct 
was unlawful in every single state of the Union. 
Thus Taney’s theory seems dubious as applied to other kinds of 
property.  Apart from the Fugitive Slave Clause, which applies only in 
limited circumstances, there is nothing in the Constitution that gives slavery 
a higher status than any other form of property.  But equating slaves with 
other forms of property is misleading.  By equating slaves with other 
property for purposes of due process, Taney overlooked the fact that the 
Constitution treats them both as property and as persons, as well as the 
special treatment that the legal system had always given the slavery issue.  
Indeed, the Fugitive Slave Clause itself seems more akin to the companion 
clause requiring states to extradite fugitives from justice, rather than being a 
property protection. 
At the heart of Taney’s argument that a free territory would deprive a 
slaveholder of property was the assumption that territorial law would 
otherwise recognize the slave relationship.  This was in effect a 
constitutional choice-of-law rule, holding that slave status was governed by 
the state in which the alleged owner and slave had previously been 
domiciled, even if they now assumed a domicile in a jurisdiction that did not 
explicitly recognize slavery.  As discussed earlier, this choice-of-law rule 
was not generally recognized in the United States or elsewhere, going back 
to the Somerset case.106  Rather, the rule was that the slave relationship was 
purely a creature of local statute.  This rule had been adopted by the 
Supreme Court itself in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,107 where Justice Story’s 
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majority opinion took the position that the “state of slavery is deemed to be a 
mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the 
territorial laws” and recognized elsewhere only on the basis of comity.108  
Thus, when an owner took a slave into a jurisdiction that did not recognize 
slavery, he had no vested property right that was entitled to local 
recognition. 
Recall that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were 
contemporaneous with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance and its 
statutory reaffirmation under the new Constitution—an action that according 
to Taney violated the Due Process Clause.  It is hard to dispute historian 
Kenneth Stampp’s appraisal: “A restriction thus imposed on congressional 
power to govern the territories, unmentioned in the Constitution, unknown to 
its framers, undiscovered for many years thereafter, but recently devised by 
John C. Calhoun and other proslavery partisans, was now, according to the 
opinion of the Court, the law of the land.”109 
IV.  EVALUATING DRED SCOTT 
Dred Scott v. Sandford has a singular position in the history of the 
Supreme Court.  Many judicial decisions are failures, like many other human 
actions.  But no other decisions contrived to fail across so many different 
dimensions—as an exercise in judicial overreaching, intellectual dishonesty, 
and disastrous statesmanship—and to do so in the defense of an institution 
whose very existence was a violation of human rights. 
A.  Constitutional Justification 
There is little reason to think that at the time the Constitution was 
framed, Americans understood the term “citizens of the several states” to 
mean any person born or naturalized in the United States who inhabits a 
state except one who was a former slave or any of whose ancestors had ever 
been a slave.  Nor is there any reason to believe that they understood 
“territories” to mean land owned at that time by the United States rather than 
acquired later, or a “deprivation” of property to include a restriction on 
moving property across jurisdictional lines.  Thus, the original understanding 
of constitutional terminology provides little support for Taney’s opinion. 
What about a non-originalist justification?  There is no consensus about 
how to conduct a non-originalist analysis, but a partial list would include the 
considerations of text and history that have already been discussed, 
precedent, societal consensus, developing social trends, moral judgments, 
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and pragmatic considerations.110  Of this list, the last two are the most 
controversial and are the weakest reeds when lacking support from the 
others. 
Taney clearly was not building on prior Supreme Court authority in a 
common law manner—substantive due process was a novel concept for the 
Court, the interpretation of the Property Clause contradicted dictum by Chief 
Justice Marshall, and the citizenship holding did not rest on earlier Supreme 
Court analyses of citizenship.  State and lower federal court holdings had 
split into Northern and Southern approaches to slavery issues, with the 
Southern courts moving away from earlier doctrines that still had support in 
the North.  Certainly, there was nothing like a consensus for the Court to 
build on, or even a nationwide trend.  Internationally, the movement was 
against slavery, as shown by British abolition of the slave trade. 
This leaves us with the morality issue and pragmatic factors 
(“statesmanship”).  The moral issue does not need discussion.  On the 
pragmatic side, the decision was at best unhelpful.  As discussed in Part C, it 
undercut the popular sovereignty position of Stephen Douglas and fueled 
Republican anger.  Taney’s position that territories had to allow slavery until 
they applied for statehood was just an invitation for another Bloody Kansas, 
where violence between pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions had become a 
national flashpoint.  But as we will see in the next section, the failure of 
statesmanship may have in part been due to the covert efforts of President 
Buchanan to influence the decision—and perhaps no one in U.S. history has 
ever had more disastrously bad judgment than James Buchanan. 
B.  Legal Process Pathologies 
Dred Scott represents perhaps the greatest example of Executive 
intrusion into the Court’s deliberations in U.S. history.  On February 3, 
1857, James Buchanan wrote to Justice Catron to find out when the decision 
would come down.111  Catron expected a decision in conference on February 
14, but he wrote back on February 19 explaining that there were delays.112  
He told Buchanan that he could say in his inaugural address that the 
Supreme Court was going to decide on the constitutionality of the Missouri 
Compromise.113  Catron also gave details about the views of individual 
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Justices.  Justice Grier was also in communication with Buchanan.  
Buchanan wrote Grier, pressuring him to join the Southern majority so that 
the Court’s decision would not appear too sectional.114 
Buchanan duly urged citizens in his inaugural address to abide by the 
Court’s decision, which he of course knew in advance would be favorable to 
slavery.115  Later, Buchanan again exploited the decision.  In recommending 
the admission of Kansas as a slave state, he said that the Supreme Court had 
ruled “that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the Constitution of the 
United States,” and that “Kansas is therefore at this moment as much a slave 
state as Georgia or South Carolina.”116  According to Fehrenbacher, Taney 
and Buchanan may also have communicated beforehand on the issue of 
whether a territorial legislature could prohibit slavery, an issue that Taney 
was careful in his opinion to address to the detriment of the “popular 
sovereignty” approach of Senator Douglas.117 
To add to the procedural irregularity, Taney refused to allow the 
dissenters to have a copy of the opinion of the Court118 and continued 
making secret revisions even after the decision was announced.  Curtis 
contended that about eighteen pages were added to the opinion responding to 
the dissents, an assertion that seems to be correct.119  As a result, the “so-
called opinion of the Court included a considerable amount of material that 
few if any of the other justices heard or read before its publication.”120 
No wonder the Republicans immediately proclaimed that the decision 
was the result of a conspiracy involving Buchanan and others.  Seward 
viewed Buchanan as the mastermind behind the decision—an exaggeration, 
but as we have seen, not entirely unfounded.121 
To add to the “legal process” flaws of the decision is the massive 
confusion about what the Court actually held.  Taney labels his opinion as 
the opinion of the Court, but a number of other Justices wrote separately 
without clearly indicating what portions of his opinion, if any, they were 
joining.122  For instance, some historians believe that only three Justices 
agreed that a black could not be a citizen of the United States.123  Even 
today, the question remains disputed.  As Fehrenbacher said, “efforts at 
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clarification by several generations of scholars have, in some respects, only 
added new levels of confusion.”124 
As Part C explains, we know now that Buchanan was on the verge of 
breaking with Douglas over the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution for 
Kansas, and in fact he relied on Dred Scott to help justify his position.  It 
may not be unduly paranoid to assume that he intended all along for the 
Court to help him undermine Douglas’s platform of popular sovereignty. 
C.  Practical Impact 
The end of the 1850s found the nation poised on the brink of disaster.  
The Democratic Party was shattered by Southern demands that the party 
repudiate popular sovereignty and endorse a slave code.  The Republicans 
had a strong base of support in the North.  By nominating a moderate 
“westerner” like Lincoln, they could pick up Illinois and other swing states 
in the North.  By the time it was actually held, the election of 1860 was 
almost a foregone conclusion.  Although Lincoln was outvoted nationally by 
supporters of Douglas and other candidates, the Republicans’ strength in the 
North gave them the Electoral College and the Presidency.  Key figures in 
the South had already announced that living under a Republican president 
was utterly unacceptable to them.125 
Even before the results were in, Southern fire-eaters had warned that 
Lincoln’s election would dissolve the Union.  The governor of South 
Carolina had opened correspondence in October with other Southern 
governors about ways and means of pursuing secession.  Within three weeks 
of the election, conventions to consider secession were called in South 
Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Georgia.  In the early afternoon 
of December 20, the South Carolina convention voted to secede.  Georgia, 
Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas followed by the end of 
January.  Within another week or so, delegates from these states had met in 
convention, adopted a constitution closely modeled after that of the United 
States, and elected Jefferson Davis as provisional president.  All this was 
accomplished well before Lincoln was scheduled to take office in March.126 
Dred Scott cannot be called the cause of the Civil War.  Such events 
have complex causes rather than a single trigger.  Indeed, despite a 
widespread contrary impression, the decision did not have an immediate or 
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direct effect on secession.  But Dred Scott certainly did nothing to bridge the 
differences between the two sections of the country.  Instead, it handed a 
complete victory to one side.  As a Georgia newspaper said at the time, the 
Court’s opinion “cover[ed] every question regarding slavery and settle[d] it 
in favor of the South.”127  Doing so could only strengthen Southern 
perception that their own side was entirely in the right and the other side 
completely misguided, thus increasing polarization.  It also pushed the 
Republicans toward a more radical position, strengthening their “belief in a 
slavepower conspiracy.”128 
As Paul Finkelman has said, 
Most northerners found the decision shocking and immoral.  
Republicans attacked it with great effect in the political campaigns 
of 1857–1860.  It doubtless helped Lincoln win the presidential 
election in 1860.  That in turn led South Carolina and eventually ten 
other states to abandon the United States and try to form their own 
country.  That led to civil war.129 
Indeed, according to Fehrenbacher, the Republican response “combined 
furious anger at the import of the decision with half-suppressed delight at its 
contemplated political effects.”130  Northern Democrats suffered big losses 
in the 1858 elections, and “Lecompton and Dred Scott accounted for much 
of this Republican gain.”131 
Although the decision initially received broad support from 
Democrats,132 Dred Scott was logically inconsistent with the views of the 
faction with the broadest national support headed by Stephen Douglas.  
Douglas favored territorial sovereignty on the issue of slavery.  But Taney 
made it clear that territories had no power to ban slavery before admission to 
the Union.  Lincoln attempted to exploit this in his famous Freeport 
question, although Douglas dodged the issue in his response by claiming that 
a territory could exclude slavery simply by failing to pass any laws to protect 
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it.133  This position proved unacceptable to the South; Southerners conceded 
as a practical matter that slavery needed support from local legal institutions, 
“[b]ut it was a different matter to have the acknowledgement thrown back at 
them as a constitutional principle by the man already widely accused of 
betraying the South.”134  The Democratic convention broke apart over 
whether the platform should deny territorial power over slavery and demand 
a federal slave code for the territories.135 
A recent revision view is that Dred Scott was a centrist decision that 
helped support the unity of the Democratic Party.136  Even the revisionists 
concede, however, that the opinion “did aggravate some tensions responsible 
for the Civil War.”137  Given Taney’s vehemently pro-Southern attitude, it is 
difficult to accept the characterization of the opinion as a centrist enterprise, 
trying to mediate between opposing factions.  If the opinion was centrist, 
what could Southerners possibly have wanted that they did not get from the 
Court?  Note also that the revisionist view holds that Northern Republicans 
were not part of the spectrum of opinion that had to be accommodated in a 
compromise.138  The assertion seems to be that the opinion was a reasonable 
compromise among the various Democratic factions.  If so, it was a 
compromise that went out of its way to reject the key element of Douglas’s 
position: territorial sovereignty.139  Even within the Democratic party, the 
decision was not a compromise, but instead it was a total victory for the 
constitutional views of one wing of the party, and not surprisingly so given 
Buchanan’s covert involvement in the decision. 
The Court had other options open to it.  It could have held that the prior 
Missouri judgment was res judicata, or that in any event Missouri law 
determined whether to give effect to Scott’s prior residence in arguably free 
territory.  It could have ruled solely on the citizenship issue while upholding 
Congress’s power over the territories or avoiding that issue.  We can only 
speculate about how any of these other options would have affected the 
course of events.  But it is plausible to think that, for instance, a decision 
endorsing control by territorial legislatures over slavery might have boosted 
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the acceptability of popular sovereignty as a solution, helping to hold the 
Democratic Party together as a non-sectional force, thereby avoiding the 
secession crisis.140 
Even if, as revisionists argue, Dred Scott did not help bring on the war, 
it would still be notable as a symptom of the polarization that would soon 
lead to the war.  Taney’s opinion was an aggressive statement of the purist 
Southern position.  Taney’s unwillingness to rest the decision on narrower 
grounds and his insistence on addressing the issue of territorial sovereignty 
had little to do with the legal dimensions of the case and more to do with the 
rising demands of Southerners for absolute national adherence to their 
views.  Rather than seeking a middle ground, Taney joined with the 
sectional forces that were pulling the country apart. 
V.  DRED SCOTT AND JUDICIAL METHOD 
Even Carl Swisher, a great admirer of Taney, admitted that Dred Scott 
has “gone down in history as a major disaster.”141  Indeed, Dred Scott seems 
to have an unequaled supply of failings.  On the legal process level, it 
featured illicit communications between the President and select Justices, 
followed by a refusal to allow dissenters to see the opinion.  Its use of 
history was selective; its legal arguments were contrived; its holding a 
muddle.  It tortured constitutional text, reading what amounted to an 
expiration date into the Property Clause.  It rendered no less than three 
earthshaking constitutional innovations: the ineligibility of blacks for 
citizenship; the gutting of the Property Clause; and the creation of 
substantive due process—more or less the equivalent of three major 
constitutional cases like Miranda v. Arizona142 or Roe v. Wade143 wrapped 
into one.  Worse, none of those three innovations, let alone all three together, 
were necessary to the decision of the case.144 
At best Dred Scott was a symptom of the polarization that was soon to 
lead the country into civil war.  But worse than that, it may actually have 
contributed to the march toward war by undermining popular sovereignty as 
a compromise and pushing Republicans to more extreme positions.  And 
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worst of all, these flawed actions were done in the service of the institution 
of slavery. 
In methodological terms, Dred Scott was self-consciously originalist.  
Taney stressed that the Constitution “must be construed now as it was 
understood at the time of its adoption.”145  He continued: 
It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning . . . and as 
long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in 
the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it 
spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on 
and adopted by the people of the United States.146 
Any other approach, Taney argued, “would abrogate the judicial character of 
this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of 
the day.”147  Taney was not a particularly skilled originalist, and perhaps an 
originalist judge who was a better historian would have reached different 
conclusions.  But Dred Scott raises some real questions about originalism.  If 
Dred Scott was correct on originalist grounds, originalism looks morally 
questionable at least when the original understanding is tied up with earlier 
prejudices such as racism and sexism.  On the other hand, if Dred Scott was 
wrong on originalist grounds, it seems to weaken the claim that originalism 
can restrain judicial willfulness. 
Perhaps it is unfair to hold the result in Dred Scott against originalism as 
a methodology any more than the example of Hitler is a fair criticism of 
vegetarianism.  But Dred Scott does illustrate three inter-connected pitfalls 
of originalism.  The first is the natural tendency to read one’s own views into 
the historical record.  It is easy for anyone to fasten upon historical evidence 
that fits a preconceived vision, and given our training as advocates, lawyers 
and judges are probably more prone to this fault than historians. 
The second pitfall is the failure to acknowledge that our evidence of the 
past is often incomplete and points in different directions, so that one must 
exercise a degree of humility in drawing conclusions.  This is a lesson, one 
hopes, that professional historians learn in graduate school, but few judges 
have training in history.  Judges and lawyers in general seem to find the 
lessons of history clear to an extent that seems oblivious to the fragmentary 
nature of the historical record. 
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Finally, and most fundamentally, it is often not merely the evidence but 
the historical reality that is ambiguous.  The attitudes of the Framing 
generation toward slavery were not only varied among individuals but often 
profoundly complex and conflicted in the case of a single individual; the 
same Jefferson who could say of slavery that he “tremble[d] for [his] 
country when [he] reflect[ed] that God is just”148 could also abuse his 
position as master to have an affair with one of his own slaves. 
Those who see the original Constitution and the legal system of its time 
as unambiguously pro-slavery have been eager to defend the logic of 
Taney’s opinion.  There is no blinking at the fact that the Constitution 
contained pro-slavery provisions.  But it is another thing to jump to the 
conclusion that the entire Constitution needs to be given a pro-slavery 
reading.  The legal system of the time—up to the years before the Civil 
War—treated slavery as a distinctive institution that posed problems quite 
different from other forms of property.  Southerners won concessions in the 
drafting of the Constitution, but the Constitution was not designed purely for 
the purpose of defending the interests of slaveholders. 
The Constitution’s compromise with slavery is a blot on our history.  
The revisionists are right to insist on the significance of that fact and the 
ways in which this compromise infected the American constitutional order.  
But Taney’s opinion turned that compromise into an unqualified victory for 
slavery, losing any of the sense of compromise and balance implicit in the 
original Constitution.  Given the Southern demand to give the greatest 
possible protection to slavery in an increasingly hostile world, every 
provision of the Constitution had to be interpreted as slavery friendly.  But 
this attributes a singularity of purpose and a rigorous coherence to a 
document that necessarily had to meet many different needs, and as in 
Taney’s tortured interpretation of the Property Clause, it required reading 
implicit limitations into seemingly unambiguous language. 
Antebellum Southern constitutionalism exemplifies a certain kind of 
foundationalism, which seeks to provide the Constitution with a 
foundational principle that would harmonize all of its provisions.  This kind 
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of foundationalism is endemic in constitutional discourse.149  In the case of 
Taney and Calhoun, that principle was equal treatment of the slave states; 
today, it might be protection for economic liberty for some writers150 or 
egalitarianism for others.151  Perhaps this is an indication of the strength of 
the dangerous pull toward absolute consistency and coherence and its risks 
for constitutional thinkers.  Constitutions are not philosophical treatises; they 
are practical agreements about governance among people with diverse 
viewpoints.  Trying to bring all of the Constitution into complete harmony 
loses sight of the need for a viable constitutional scheme to balance 
opposing interests and viewpoints. 
Having a sense of balance is a prosaic, unexciting trait that we often 
take for granted.  It is only when that sense of balance is completely lacking 
that we realize its importance.  Dred Scott shows what can happen when a 
judge loses his balance at a critical moment.  The case’s aftermath shows 
what can happen, far more disastrously, when the same thing happens to a 
nation’s politics. 
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